Testing the new historiography of alchemy : the case of Kenelm Digby by Hausz, Frigyes
3Testing the New Historiography of Alchemy: the Case of Kenelm DigbyFrigyes HauszSZTE-BTK Angol szak
Történettudományi Szekció, 2nd prize, 2009
Abstract
In the last two decades, a new framework for the study of alchemy, challenging 
the older Jungian views, has been taking shape by the efforts of two American 
historians of science, Lawrence Principe and William Newman. The present 
paper intends to test this new framework through a case study of a 17th century 
English natural philosopher named Kenelm Digby. In the light of my results, 
the new metanarrative of alchemy draws a false picture of the discipline, 
as alchemy was a complex philosophical system with its own religious and 
cultural connotations. 
Keywords: Alchemy, Kenelm Digby, Scientific Revolution, New 
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Introduction
By looking at the contemporary literature of the history of science, there now 
seems to be a revival of scholarly interest towards alchemy (e.g. Moran 2005; 
Newman 2004). One may ask why this newfound attention towards this long 
neglected field of study? Science, after all, is rational and ordered in contrast 
to alchemy which is irrational and disorderly.
There are numerous possible answers for this question. From the perspective 
of popular culture, the fashionable nature of the topic is obvious. From the 
perspective of the historian of science, the reason is practical: a meticulous 
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study of the social and cultural environment will yield a more detailed picture 
on science of earlier periods. But a more plausible reason for the revival of 
interest can be found in the successful linkage of some of the most prominent 
figures of early modern science to alchemy. The works of Dobbs and Westfall 
on Newton’s alchemical experiments took the question of alchemy into serious 
consideration and did not sweep it aside as the youthful folly of the natural 
philosopher (cf.: Dobbs 1975; Dobbs 1991; Westfall 1983). In fact Dobbs even 
suggested that Newton might have used alchemy as a scientific explanatory 
tool, a way to understand nature better. Dobbs’ work shed light on the 
importance of alchemy and as a result, scholars slowly started to reveal the 
alchemical dimensions of other great natural philosophers including Robert 
Boyle and John Locke (On the alchemy of Boyle see: Principe 1998). 
The result of these new biographical studies showed that the study of the 
history of alchemy is not an option but a must as it is deeply intertwined with 
the formation of new scientific ideas. Finally, alchemy received the necessary 
scholarly recognition and the reinterpretation of early modern science has 
begun. 
This shift in the scholarly approach, however, was not enough, as the 
study of alchemy still lacked a standardized research method, and a proper 
metanarrative. To solve this problem, Professors William R. Newman and 
Lawrence M. Principe started to form the theory that Principe has called 
the “New Historiography of Alchemy” (Principe 2004). This programme 
originally intended to provide a complex framework for the future case 
studies of alchemical authors (Principe & Newman 2001). Although they 
have received positive critiques from some leading authorities on the study 
of alchemy, such as Allen G. Debus or Nicholas Clulee, and their articles were 
published in important journals like Isis and Ambix, there were also some 
objections against certain aspects of their model, namely that it downplays 
the religious, spiritual and occult dimensions of alchemy. These will be 
meticulously described and discussed in the next chapter, as the very objective 
of this paper is to test the model presented by Principe and Newman. 
To put the “new historiography of alchemy” to the test I intend to carry 
out a case study of a 17th century English natural philosopher/courtier/
alchemist named Kenelm Digby (1603-1665), within the framework provided 
by Newman and Principe. With the contextualization of Digby in the 
intellectual environment of the 17th century and with the analysis of some 
of his alchemical works I have a twofold objective: to reconstruct Digby’s 
worldview that could yield some insight into the shifting values in the era 
of the Scientific Revolution; and to illustrate the deficiencies of the Principe-
Newman model of alchemy. 
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Choosing Digby as the subject of the case study is justified by numerous 
factors. First, he was a natural philosopher of major importance in his time. 
Secondly, he was an alchemist who made use of his alchemical readings in 
his scientific theories. Thirdly, he was a devout Catholic who tried to prove 
the tenets of his faith with the aforementioned explanatory tools. Religiosity, 
natural science and alchemical tradition created an organic unity in Digby’s 
mind. The points I have mentioned above make Digby the ideal subject of 
my case study, as through his wide range of interests I can test the Newman-
Principe model of alchemy. 
After this brief overview, and justification of my research subject, my paper 
will start with the delineation of the main tenets of the Newman-Principe 
model of alchemy and its deficiencies. 
1. The Principe Newman Thesis of Alchemy
Before we enter into the fields of Digby’s alchemical interests, it would be 
necessary first to clarify what alchemy is. As it will be seen from my approach, 
17th century alchemy – in my view – was a complex and always changing 
system of laboratory practice, philosophy and religion that among its various 
goals aimed at improving nature, perfecting the adept itself and also meant to 
provide explanations for natural phenomena.
After the scholarly recognition of Newton’s alchemical pursuits, the 
research of alchemy received a strong impetus. Despite the renewed efforts 
in the research into alchemy, the terminology of the field was a bit hazy and 
the study of alchemy lacked a good theoretical framework. With the intention 
of solving this problem, William Newman and Lawrence Principe have 
made attempts in the last 20 years to standardize the study of alchemy. Their 
programme began when Newman in the 1980s discovered that the Summa 
Perfectionis written by pseudo-Geber in the 14th century already contained the 
germs of the corpuscular philosophy (cf.: Newman 2006). With his newfound 
discovery, he insisted on proving direct continuity between alchemy and 
chemistry.
In a joint article Principe and Newman revisited the theory of continuity 
from a different angle (Principe & Newman 1998). In the “Alchemy vs. 
Chemistry: The Etymological Origins of a Historiographical Mistake” the 
American authors claimed that prior to the last two decades of the 17th century, 
efforts to differentiate alchemy from chemistry are wrong and presentist. “The 
eventual distancing” –they argue—“of alchemy from chemistry arose from an 
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etymological mistake” committed by some Paracelsian alchemists (Principe 
& Newman 1998, 64). The study of Principe and Newman has demonstrated 
with examples that it was only in the 18th century that transmutational 
alchemy was differentiated from chemistry.
Instead of making a distinction, Principe and Newman proposed the use of 
the archaically spelt “chymistry” to emphasize that the two disciplines were 
in fact one before the 1680s. It is true that 17th century authors of “chemical” 
texts used the traditional “alchemical” names to denominate different 
substances. The subject of my case study was no exception. Alchemists were 
not exclusively aiming at transmuting gold, some of them made their living 
by creating dyes or other practical chemicals.
But if someone thinks of Newton’s letter of April 26th 1676 to Oldenburg, 
things are seen from a different perspective. In this letter Newton comments 
on Boyle’s frivolity of giving away details of an important alchemical process 
and scorns him because it was “possibly an inlet of something more noble 
and not to be communicated without immense damage to the world if there 
be any verity in the hermetic writers” (Turnbull 1960, 515 in Rattansi 1972, 
168). Taking into consideration that the Philosophical Transactions since its 
first volume (1661) published articles on biology, metallurgy and chemical 
experiments using the traditional alchemical notions, it is clear that there 
existed a huge difference between a secretive kind of chymistry and vulgar 
chymistry.
It will be shown later that the rise of mechanical philosophy irrefutably 
brought simpler methods of argumentation into chemical explanations, 
which soon became a distinctive factor between alchemy and chemistry. Thus 
the origin of the alchemy/chemistry dichotomy is not just an etymological 
problem but also a historical one. 
By applying the term “chymistry” and by representing it as the direct 
ancestor of chemistry Principe and Newman aimed at showing that alchemy 
was mainly a technical activity at that time. By doing that they are presenting 
only one side of alchemy and they are trying to downplay its links with both 
the spiritual and occult traditions. They argue that alchemy received its strong 
spiritual dimension in the 19th century during the Victorian occultist revival, 
and that the alchemy of the 16th-17th century was much more practical. They 
criticised the Jungian understanding of alchemy, in which the alchemists 
were less concerned with the chemical reactions than with psychic states 
taking place within the practitioner (Principe & Newman 1998, 402). Jung’s 
interpretation gives the definition for spiritual alchemy whose original goal is 
to better the alchemist itself. Newman and Principe are very right to dismiss 
those who see alchemy as solely spiritual discipline whose exclusive goal was 
to perfect the adept itself (Principe & Newman 2004, x.). It would be next to 
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useless to refute this statement as alchemy truly was not a monolithic entity. 
Even so it is hard to believe that any professional scholar of alchemy in 1998, 
the time of the study’s publication, believed that alchemy was solely a spiritual 
endeavour. Therefore their statement seems somewhat unnecessary. And if 
the intention of Newman and Principe was to prove that spiritual alchemy as 
such was a marginal phenomenon, however, then they were mistaken.
Already in the 4th century Zosimos of Panoplis established a homology 
between the transformation of metals and the human operator (Newman 
2004, 29-31). Among other proponents of the so called spiritual alchemy we 
can mention 14th century alchemist Petrus Bonus of Ferrara or the English 
John Dee from the 16th century (Szőnyi 1998, 207-217). Moreover, in the light 
of the newest findings it seems that Robert Boyle’s alchemical quest was 
influenced by John Dee’s spiritual alchemy and angelic magic (Robert Boyle`s 
Dialogue on the Converse with Angels Aided by the Philosophers Stone in Principe, 
1998). Knowing these facts it seems fair to conclude that spiritual alchemy 
was anything but marginal throughout the last two millennia. 
The last thing I want to touch upon is the religiosity of alchemy. Newman 
in his recent book titled Promethean Ambitions suggests that alchemy acquired 
its religious character only in the 14th century (Newman 2004, 83). In the 1320s 
Pope John XXII issued a condemnation of alchemy that labelled alchemists 
as simple counterfeiters. In Newman’s opinion this was the main reason 
why the practitioners of the art started to cloak their discipline in religious 
language. There are three major problems with this concept. First we know 
several alchemists from the Middle Ages –the aforementioned Zosimos of 
Panoplis is one of them— who used overtly religious motifs in their writings. 
Secondly, Newman seriously underestimated the alchemists – it is hard to 
imagine that alchemists were stupid enough to risk the possibility of being 
labelled as heretic, by using religious phrases. And finally, the religious 
nature of alchemy was more than just a disguise, because, for instance, 
Digby’s alchemical philosophical system was built around the fundaments of 
devout religiosity.
The initial criticism I unfolded in this part should serve to outline my 
approach in the next parts of my paper. After the necessary contextualization 
of Digby’s life and his natural philosophy in the intellectual environment of 
the 17th century, I will move on to discuss Digby’s alchemy in particular. In 
the subsequent parts will analyse Digby’s works and will deliver my main 
criticism of the Principe-Newman thesis. Whereas I do not intend to reflect 
directly on their theory of continuity, I propose to carry out a more exhaustive 
analysis on their views concerning the dichotomy between alchemy and 
chemistry. In my view such dichotomy was already existent around the 
1650s I will support my arguments with the analysis of Digby’s work titled 
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Of the Sympathetic Powder. As Kenelm Digby was not a representative of 
spiritual alchemy in the strictest sense –although he seemed to understand 
the neoplatonic interpretation of alchemy (Szőnyi 1998, 265-273) – I wish to 
visit that issue only tangentially. On the other hand, I intend to discuss the 
question of alchemy’s religious nature. My impression is that Digby’s whole 
structure of scientific and alchemical endeavours was constructed around 
a solid fundament of Catholic faith. Therefore, in his case, religiosity as a 
disguise cannot come into mind as an option. To underpin my argument I 
will use Digby’s work titled The Vegetation of Plants. The paper will conclude 
with the discussion of Digby’s effect on posterity using a manuscript from 
the Ashmolean Collection in the Bodleian Library, which, to the best of my 
knowledge, has never been referred to before (Bodleian Library, Ashmolean 
Collection, 788, Fol. 185-7, “of the Powder of Sympathy” in a letter to “R.W. 
J.”).
During my work I made extensive use of Betty Dobbs` articles on Kenelm 
Digby. Dobbs’ three articles that were published in the Ambix journal give 
important information on Digby’s natural philosophy and alchemy. Also these 
three will serve as the preliminary information upon which I will construct 
my own argument (Dobbs 1971; Dobbs 1973; Dobbs 1974). On Digby’s 
alchemy and religiosity I consulted an article by Bruce Janacek (Janacek 2000). 
His findings helped me to develop my views concerning Digby’s Catholicism. 
2. Digby’s Life and His Role in the Rise of Natural Sciences 
Kenelm Digby was born in 1603. Son to Everard Digby, the executed catholic 
conspirator, he was raised to be a Catholic. Although he joined the Church of 
England in order to build his career, he remained loyal to his original Catholic 
faith. He studied at Gloucester Hall, Oxford under the guidance of Thomas 
Allen, a humanist with Roman Catholic sympathies (Foster 2004; on English 
Catholicism in Oxford see: Foster 1981). Digby was an exceptional student, 
Allen referred to him as the Mirandola of his Age (Dobbs 1973, 145).
After his university studies he made a grand tour around Europe. During 
his travels Digby developed a really colourful personality; he was equally 
welcome at courts, in laboratories and the meetings of learned societies 
on both sides of the English Channel (Dobbs 1971, 2). This sociability and 
excellent interpersonal skills were important qualities that previsioned the 
nature of his scientific career. 
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In 1633, after the death of his wife Venetia, Digby removed himself from 
social life, and as John Aubrey writes in his Brief Lives: “he retired into 
Gresham-colledge at London where he diverted himselfe with his Chymistry 
and the Professors` good conversation” (Foster 2004). While at Gresham 
College along with his alchemical experiments guided by the Hungarian 
alchemist János Bánfihunyadi, he looked at phenomena of lodestones, 
magnetism, reflection and refraction, also he made an enquiry into the 
circulatory system and he formed the basis for his later work, the Two Treatises 
(Foster 2004; on Bánfihunyadi see: Appleby 2004). 
Although Gresham College was a good place to start his quest for 
knowledge, Paris was the capital of northern European culture and soon 
it became Digby’s destination. There Gallican Roman Catholicism allowed 
scientist and natural philosophers to exchange ideas in freedom. Digby by 
this time had serious doubts about the validity of Anglican doctrines, and 
decided to convert to Catholicism. In 1635 he arrived in Paris and took up his 
residence near the University of Sorbonne and the royal chemistry laboratory. 
During his time in Paris, Digby became associated with the so-called 
Newcastle Circle, a group of English mechanical philosophers composed 
of Thomas Hobbes, Charles Cavendish, William Cavendish and John Pell. 
The group hoped that by using the principles of natural philosophy, some 
universal truths on the nature of God could be clarified (Janacek 2000, 97).
At the same time along with the English exiles, Digby met virtually all 
of the most important proponents of the new mechanical philosophy like 
René Descartes (1596-1650), Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Marin Mersenne 
(1588-1648) and discussed its subtleties with them. Later, when he returned to 
England he remained in active correspondence with the French philosophers, 
an act that was to become highly profitable for the later Royal Society. Digby 
adopted the atomist and mechanical ideas of the aforementioned philosophers, 
but instead of using them to create a completely new philosophical system, he 
tried to integrate them into the Aristotelian framework. 
In this sense Digby was a bit of an ancient-modern go-between: he always 
viewed mechanical philosophy as inferior to theology. This outlook is 
reflected in all of his works. 
His diverse fields of study included astronomy, matter theory and biology. 
While he reflected on almost all problems that were current in his time, not 
many have ever suggested that he was an important thinker of the Scientific 
Revolution and it is not the intent here either. He was rather the man “who 
knew everyone and who took an interest in every advance” (Dobbs 1971, 2). 
The huge number of his acquaintances and correspondents served the Royal 
Society very well when Digby joined in 1660. This mediator role granted Digby 
the scholarly recognition. What he lacked in the study of natural sciences, he 
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made up for with extremely good reputation. His social recognition and of 
course his new views granted him that his works were widely read, even at 
the end of the 17th century by as prominent thinkers as Isaac Newton himself. 
In the light of this account it can be concluded that Digby – although 
his works were not significant contributions to natural science - was as an 
important character of the Scientific Revolution who played an important 
role in shaping the intellectual life of the early 17th century. This argument 
legitimizes my research, as at that time Digby’s works were considered as 
mainstream natural philosophy and not just a marginal anomaly. 
3. Alchemy and Chemistry in the 17th Century and Digby’s 
Alchemy
In the 17th century alchemy was a truly heterogeneous discipline. Although 
it is almost impossible to logically classify its different traditions, we should 
try to differentiate at least two different threads in alchemy. The original 
tradition, although it had its spiritual ramifications, was not the huge 
philosophical system as it was to become later. Pseudo-Roger Bacon’s Breve 
Breviarium points out that all metals are made of the same elements, namely 
mercury and sulphur. The aim of the alchemist is mainly the transmutation of 
metals (Newman 2004, 67).
The overall picture of alchemy has changed, however, with the totalizing 
model of Paracelsus (1493-1541). He suggested that not just the metals, but 
the whole world was made of three principles: mercury, sulphur and salt (the 
tria prima). Paracelsus’ theory was aiming at providing a total explanation 
for the world, and alchemy transformed into an entire philosophical system. 
He also emphasized the iatrochemical or medicine making dimension of 
alchemy. Under the influence of the paracelsian doctrine of the tria prima, 
whole chemical philosophies were formed, and alchemy started to gradually 
become an explanation for natural phenomena. 
Almost a century before the establishment of the Royal Society, alchemical 
circles were formed around Europe with the intention of propagating 
alchemical knowledge. In England the so called Hartlib Circle was the most 
prominent, The Hartlib Circle worked almost like a scientific institution at 
that time, in a way it can be viewed as one of the forerunners of the Royal 
Society (Sheffield, HROnline, 2002). They collected everything that was 
in connection with alchemy and chemistry, clear and practical recipes for 
dyes or obscure descriptions for Philosopher’s Stone were equally present 
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among the hand-copied archives of the group. The existence of groups such 
as Hartlib’s was crucial as chemistry as a discipline was not taught officially 
at universities. In fact chemistry was not considered a science at all in the 
Aristotelian framework of sciences. 
Although it was not part of the university curriculum it is very likely that 
Digby’s alchemical endeavours can be attributed to some extent to his most 
favoured tutor Thomas Allen. Allen was a curious figure: he was known for 
his occult interests, and among his former pupils we can find Philip Sydney 
and Robert Fludd. Although there is not much known on his particular views 
on alchemy (unfortunately only a commentary on Ptolemaius survived), his 
paracelsian outlook could be deduced from his books that he bequeathed to 
Digby.
The true beginning of Digby’s alchemical work, can be dated back to his 
stay at Gresham College. There Digby worked with the Transylvanian János 
Bánfihunyadi (Dobbs 1973, 148). It is fairly well known from Digby’s letters 
and writings that Digby and Bánfihunyadi were mainly concerned with the 
paracelsian model of alchemy. As it was mentioned before, the alchemy of 
Paracelsus also tried to describe the world in its alchemical terms. Digby’s 
oeuvre spectacularly exemplifies this. 
Digby’s self imposed exile in France was a serious turning point in his natural 
philosophy and alchemy alike. The mechanical philosophy he adapted from 
the French philosophers transformed his views fundamentally. Although he 
preserved the Catholic Aristotelian framework of his knowledge, he started 
to give mechanical explanations for natural and supernatural phenomena. 
Accordingly, Digby’s alchemy became different from the original paracelsian 
one: it started to become a science. In the next two sections I will elucidate 
this through the example of Digby’s On the Sympathetic Powder, and On The 
Vegetation of Plants.
4. The Sympathetic Powder
Digby’s sympathetic powder was just a variation of the popular paracelsian 
16th-17th century weapon salve treatment for wounds. The weapon salve 
was a perfect example of the use of alchemy in the realm of pharmacy. In all 
treatments of the weapon-salve type, the medication was placed on the weapon 
or on an old bandage and the wound itself was simply washed. Considering 
the nature of other sixteenth and seventeenth century medications, cleaning 
the wound might have been more effective. 
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Digby’s account of the use of the powder was almost similar, when he told 
his story to an assembly of doctors in Montpellier in 1658 (Digby 1669). Digby 
began with stating that he was a propagator of this medicine as far as the 
Western world was concerned. The powder became famous when it was used 
by Digby to cure the wound of James Howell by soaking an old bandage in a 
solution of this powder (op. cit., 150). Digby’s powder met almost unanimous 
popularity and he was no less celebrated for it than William Harvey had been 
for his study on blood circulation (Gilman 1999, 265).
Digby’s powder might be curious from the view of the contemporary 
reader to say the least, but it would not be fair to connect Digby entirely with 
the remnants of Renaissance natural magic: one has to see the huge stride 
Digby made to remove it from the realm of the occult. 
Much of the received natural philosophy in the early seventeenth century, 
either Aristotelian or Renaissance Hermetic, discussed relationships, the 
causes of which were unknown. After the fact of the relationship between two 
things were established, the Aristotelian view provided casual explanation 
with “occult qualities”, and the hermetic view with “hidden sympathies” –the 
two were practically the same (Dobbs 1971, 10). The reason for the relationship 
was not sought at all, as it was provided on experimental basis. Digby did not 
reject the fact of such relationships; he was just opposed to the explanatory 
strategies of Aristotelianism and Hermeticism. He vehemently objected to the 
use of the principles of sympathetic magic or occult qualities: 
They would have us take for ready mony some terms, which we 
understand not, nor know what they signifie. They would pay us with 
conveniences, with resemblances, with Sympathies, with Magnetical 
virtues, and such terms, without explicating what these terms mean 
(Digby 1669, 152).
Instead of resorting to occult qualities or hidden sympathies, Digby used the 
mechanical philosophy he acquired in France, to explain causal relationships. 
This was something that never had happened before, and in my view, 
transformed alchemy into something else.
In its original context the sympathetic powder acted through occult qualities 
and hidden sympathies, Digby on the other hand employed mechanical 
causes of matter and motion to explain its function. Digby’s explanation was 
a carefully built logical construction based on the Cartesian Vortex theory that 
postulated that space was filled with matter and everything whirled around 
the Sun. 
Digby constructed the following argument: first the Sun attracts and 
removes the blood atoms from the blood covered bandage, and the atoms 
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of the powder being incorporated in the blood are also leaving the bandage. 
Secondly, the heat of the inflamed wound attracts the blood atoms forcefully 
because the blood in the wound and the blood previously on the bandage 
are of the same nature. Thirdly the blood atoms mingled with the healing 
powder enters into the wound and the powder takes effect. The powder is 
working better at a distance because the blood atoms with the medicament 
are re-entering their natural beds (Digby 1669, 154).
From the preceding example it can be easily seen that Digby was attempting 
to explain a causal relationship in a way that was consonant with his mechanical 
universe. With this he managed to remove the paracelsian weapon-salve from 
the realm of the occult (Dobbs 1971, 13). Although Digby’s theory was based 
on a non-existing phenomenon, no one could argue against the fact that with 
his explanation he was trying to rationalize alchemy. With the emergence 
of mechanistic philosophy in the realm of alchemy, a fundamental change 
started to take shape, which eventually transformed alchemy –or chymistry—
into chemistry. Following this line of reasoning it seems fair to conclude that 
well before 1680, as Newman and Principe suggested, a large chasm started 
to open between alchemy and chemistry.
5. The Vegetation of Plants
Digby’s paper, titled A Discourse Concerning the Vegetation of Plants was the 
first formal publication authorized by the Royal Society (Foster 2004). It 
described detailed observations and experiments on vegetation. In a similar 
manner to the Sympathetic Powder, Digby resorted to alchemical language 
and the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy to describe a phenomenon which 
in this case was the vegetation of plants (Janacek 2000, 107).
In the age of Digby the processes of vegetation, germination in particular 
were cosmic events. The creation of life was exclusively attributed to God, 
therefore vegetation had important corollaries in religion. Still Digby 
believed that there was nothing mysterious about it, as it was comprehensible 
by natural means, with the use of alchemical notions. After describing the 
process of vegetation, however, Digby started to discuss a topic that had even 
stronger theological implications, namely the revivification of dead plants, 
practically the act resurrection.
Digby mentions an occasion on which he and Bánfihunyadi managed to 
resurrect dead plants with his process (Digby 1661, 77-78). Resurrection of 
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plants was one thing, but Digby had more grandiose aims in mind as the 
following quotation demonstrates:
This Universall Spirit then being Homogeneall to all things, and being 
in effect the Spirit of Life, not onely to Plants, but to Animals also: were 
it not worth the labour to render it as usefull to mens bodyes, as to the 
reparations of Plants (Digby 1661, 71)?
It seems that Digby intended to use the method of Palingenesis to resurrect 
the dead. Drawing on the works of earlier alchemical authors such as pseudo-
Albertus Magnus, he presumed the existence of a material that could grant 
life everlasting:
Albertus Magnus purchased the reputation of a Magician, for making 
all sorts of Fruit grow plentifully and perfectly, in the depth of a hard 
Winter in Germany, by meanes of this aethereall balsome. If it were made 
proportionable to mens bodyes, there is no doubt, but it would work 
alike effect upon them (Janacek 2000, 108).
With this “aethereall balsome” Digby intended to resurrect the dead which 
was exclusively in God`s power. In Digby’s case this could imply two 
things: either the meta-religious (redemptive) function of alchemy on several 
occasions, or the absolute faith in human ingenuity and science to imitate 
God. Nevertheless, it is absolutely evident that his religiosity was deeply 
intertwined with his alchemy. 
To see universal implications of life and death in vegetation was not 
unusual in the 17th century, and Digby was certainly not alone in discussing 
this issue metaphorically, theologically and literally (Ibid.). The idea of the 
resurrection of the dead had preoccupied theologians for centuries. Digby, 
although he was a devout Catholic, was not a theologian, he was a natural 
philosopher who never truly understood the Baconian advice. He read the 
Book of Nature and also the Book of the Scripture, but he never separated 
the two from each other. Thus, the New Testament was not the only source 
for Digby in the quest for resurrection. He employed his natural philosophy 
which, in fact, was an amalgamation of mechanical philosophy and alchemy. 
The fact that Digby’s work on the vegetation of plants was the first 
formal publication of the Royal Society could also lead us to an interesting 
conclusion: there was no sudden rupture between the eclecticism of Digby 
and the scientific method that was later attributed to the Royal Society. 
In the light of the preceding analysis it seems fair to conclude that in Digby’s 
mind the idea of palingenesis was intimately linked to the Christian dogma 
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of the resurrection of the body. The connection between alchemy and religion 
was not just a superficial one as Principe and Newman suggested. Alchemy 
or “chymistry” acted as an important explanatory tool in science and religion 
alike. Moreover, it functioned as an indicator of the limits of human ingenuity 
in Digby’s writings. 
6. Digby’s Reception
The history of science was not merciful to Kenelm Digby to say the least. 
Although he was among the eminent philosophers of his time, 300 years later 
he was referred to as an obscure alchemist by many historians like Marie Boas 
Hall. What are the decisive factors that in the end classify people rational 
or irrational? Digby, after all, eliminated occult qualities from alchemy. He 
was not alone with his alchemical pursuits, yet he became an archetype of 
the “obscure” pre-Enlightenment period in the eyes of positivist historians of 
science. It is most likely that his scientific notoriety was established by his use 
of the sympathetic powder. An item stored in the Ashmolean Collection in the 
Bodleian Library supports this theory. The letter can be found in Ashmole 788 
and is titled “of the powder of sympathy.” The sender is unknown and only 
the initials of the recipient’s name are known (R.W.J). The letter was dated in 
1660, five years before Digby’s death. It begins with the writer’s statement of 
his doubts about the validity of the sympathetic powder: “this distance of cure 
and quick dispatch, I take to be nothing, but an imitation of some poeticall 
faerie mythologia.”(Bodleian Library, Ashmolean Collection, 788, “of the 
Powder of Sympathy” in a letter to “R.W. J.” fol 185a.) The writer ridicules the 
sympathetic powder, his position is different from Digby’s view, who in turn 
never doubted its validity. One might jump to the sudden conclusion that the 
writer was a young proponent of mechanistic philosophy who, unlike Digby, 
completely built his knowledge on the new system and discarded its beliefs 
on the imaginary relationships between the wound and bandage. However, 
this is not the case as the letter continues in the following manner:
They paraphrase, they periphrase […],They discourse into us of […]
magnetisme of emanations of effluxions, how that radical activitie 
streams in semi-immaterial threads of atomes conducted by a Mummial 
Efflux which is a mere metaphysical chanting, & a French philosophicall 
blazon (op. cit., fol 185b). 
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The writer also criticises the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy. What 
can be concluded from this? It seems that Kenelm Digby and the author of 
this letter represented different tracks of modernization. While Digby made 
logical efforts to explain a non-existing relationship between the wound and 
the blood covered bandage, the writer of this letter simply discarded the 
relationship. Digby’s belief in the cure, and the fact that he made it known, 
labelled him as a product of the Renaissance, someone who has nothing to do 
with natural philosophy at all. He was seriously misinterpreted throughout 
the last 300 years. Although he was not an important thinker of the Scientific 
Revolution, his figure deserves more attention as his intermediary state 
between ancient and modern world views provides important cross-sectional 
views on the development of our science. 
Conclusion
The twofold aim of my paper was to carry out a small case study of Kenelm 
Digby’s alchemy and to revise the “New Historiography of Alchemy” 
proposed by professors Lawrence Principe and William Newman. I intended 
to point out that the nature of Digby’s alchemy highlights some deficiencies 
in the Principe-Newman model of alchemy. On the one hand I illustrated 
that mechanical philosophy that filtered into all natural sciences made the 
distinction possible between alchemy and chemistry well before Principe 
and Newman had suggested. Digby used mechanical principles to eliminate 
the medieval hidden sympathies in causal relationships, and with that 
he removed part of his alchemy from the realm of the occult. On the other 
hand I demonstrated that the link between alchemy and religion was not a 
superficial one. Theology and alchemy were deeply intertwined in Digby’s 
system of thought: he explained the theological notion of resurrection with 
alchemical principles. My analysis unfortunately supports the much earlier 
established argument that a successful metanarrative of alchemy is almost 
impossible. Alchemy was an idiosyncratic discipline and its pursuers cannot 
be interpreted within only one framework. 
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